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ABSTRACT 
The study aimed to identify the presence / absence of ownership 
concentration in agro-industrial companies in Ukraine and to 
investigate the possible impact of these processes on the economic 
performance of companies. We have proven that there is a significant 
level of ownership concentration among analyzed companies in both 
groups UX and UA. Although there are exceptions, there is a general 
tendency to hold a large share of equity instruments by the founders 
or major owners. We describe this phenomenon through a twin 
agency problem, arguing that such a large share of power 
concentration serves as a substitute for a weak environment for 
protecting investor rights. Concentration of property is the bulwark 
from unwanted interventions from both third parties and from state 
rulers. The study has found no significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and several indicators used as proxy for 
economic performance, namely Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit/loss 
before tax, Tobin’s Q.  
 
 
 
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/] 
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License 
 
818 
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P) 
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 10, n. 7, Special Edition PDATU 2019 
ISSN: 2236-269X 
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v10i7.914 
Our findings indicate that concentration of ownership does not affect the economic 
performance of analysed companies, regardless of whether we take for the analysis 
the accounting indicators (Profit) or market-based indicators (Tobin’s Q). 
Keywords: Equity ownership; Ownership concentration; Corporate governance; 
Tobin’s Q 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The ownership structure is seen as one of the most important mechanisms of 
corporate governance, and it becomes particularly important in conditions 
characterized by a high degree of ownership concentration (ÁVILA; ROCHA; DA 
SILVA, 2015; CONNELLY, et al., 2010; DEMSETZ; VILLALONGA, 2001; FACCIO; 
LANG, 2002; FILATOTCHEV, et al., 2007; HOLDERNESS, 2017; ILHAN-NAS, et al., 
2018; KALEZIĆ, 2015; LA PORTA; LOPEZ-DE-SILANES; SHLEIFER, 1999; 
LEPORE, et al., 2017; MUGOBO; MUTIZE; ASPELING, 2016; SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 
1986; SINGLA; GEORGE; VELIYATH, 2017; STULZ, 2005; SURESHA; 
RAVIKUMAR, 2018; THOMSEN; PEDERSEN, 2000; VEGA SALAS; DENG, 2017).  
 Recently, we witnessed a surge in research from all over the world that are 
increasingly investigating the impact of ownership structure on the performance of 
corporations (ÁVILA, et al., 2015; ILHAN-NAS, et al., 2018; KALEZIĆ, 2015; 
MUGOBO, et al., 2016). A number of those researchers have identified that in many 
jurisdictions around the world ownership is concentrated (sometimes highly 
concentrated) in the hands of few - one or more large shareholders (BARCA; 
BECHT, 2002; LA PORTA, et al., 1999; MAURY; PAJUSTE, 2005). 
 It should be noted though that traditionally it has been thought that the agency 
problem is predominantly concentrated on the relationship between managers and 
dispersed shareholders (BERLE; MEANS, 1991). However these researches focus 
attention on the ever growing role of another aspect of the agency problem, namely 
the conflict between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
(JENSEN; MECKLING, 1976; SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1986; STULZ, 2005) and large 
controlling shareholders and state rulers (STULZ, 2005).  
 It is also necessary to emphasize the dynamic aspect of the problem, since 
the distribution of power within the ownership structure is not static, for large 
shareholders constantly clash and compete with each other and with other investors 
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and authorities for gaining control, forming a ruling coalition and obtaining maximum 
private benefits from corporation (BENNEDSEN; WOLFENZON, 2000; BOLTON; 
VON THADDEN, 1998; MAURY; PAJUSTE, 2005; PAGANO; RÖELL, 1998; 
SELZNICK, 2007; WINTON, 1993; ZWIEBEL, 1995) . 
 The role of the largest shareholders is reported to be vital on account of the 
concentration of influence in their hands may have the unintended implications on 
the company's performance (BENNEDSEN; WOLFENZON, 2000; BOLTON; VON 
THADDEN, 1998; CLAESSENS, et at., 2002; CONNELLY, et al., 2010). 
 It is stressed that if large shareholders control the management or controlling 
owners they can restrain and discourage their opportunistic conduct and thereby be 
of help to minority shareholders (SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1986, SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 
1997). Even so, the number of lines of conduct for large shareholders is, of course, 
not limited to this, as they can also pursue their own interests, which may differ 
significantly from those of other shareholders, and in this way, in effect, expropriate 
their wealth (BARCA; BECHT, 2002; BURKART; PANUNZI; SHLEIFER, 2003; 
SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1997).  
 So, the issue of concentration and dispersion of companies’ ownership is of 
great significance in terms of the impact it has on corporate governance and the 
performance of companies (FILATOTCHEV, et al., 2007; SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 
1986; THOMSEN; PEDERSEN, 2000). 
 The issue of ownership concentration, however, is multifaceted and is not 
exhausted only with abovementioned reasoning as it can be explained from different 
standpoints, depending on the stance of the person who writes about it.  
 The concentration of property as we have already ascertained has a 
significant impact on the results of companies. Given that the question arises - why 
ownership tends to concentrate, what are incentives behind that process? 
 There is a consensus among researchers that ownership concentration is 
closely associated with the protection of investors' rights in each specific jurisdiction, 
and in this case, property concentration is seen as a way to shield business against 
unlawful attempts to take over the business from the outside forces (DELL’ACQUA, 
et al., 2018; LARDON; BEUSELINCK; DELOOF, 2018; PINDADO; REQUEJO; DE 
LA TORRE, 2014; J. ZHOU; LAN, 2018; JING ZHOU; TAM; LAN, 2015) 
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 There is prevalence of the belief in the overwhelming majority of sources that 
concentrated property is associated with an unsatisfactory level of legal protection 
for investors, indicating that the concentration of ownership and the protection of 
investors are in fact interdependent and concentration of ownership is substitute for 
investor protection mechanism in jurisdictions there the latter is fledgling, weak or 
absent (BURKART, et al., 2003; CASTILLO; SKAPERDAS, 2005; ILHAN-NAS, et 
al., 2018; LA PORTA, et al., 1999; SHLEIFER; WOLFENZON, 2002; WU; XU; 
YUAN, 2009).  
 However, some researchers also suggest another assumption that the 
concentration of ownership and legal protection of shareholders are not necessarily 
substitutable but complementary ones (BURKART; PANUNZI, 2006; CASELLI; DI 
GIULI, 2010; DELL’ACQUA, et al., 2018; LARDON, et al., 2018; LEPORE, et al., 
2017). 
 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny adduce several arguments 
on why the concentration of ownership occurs (1998). First of all, shareholders need 
more capital in order to exercise control over their managers and thereby avoid 
expropriation by them. Secondly, when minority shareholders are poorly protected, 
they are ready to acquire corporate rights only at such low prices, which corporations 
considering unattractive for issuing new shares.  
 Thus low demand for corporate shares by minority shareholders indirectly 
stimulates concentration of ownership (LA PORTA, et al., 1998, p. 1445). La Porta et 
al. conclude that “with poor investor protection, ownership concentration becomes a 
substitute for legal protection, because only large shareholders can hope to receive 
a return on their investment” (LA PORTA, et al., 1998, p. 1445).  
 Another important aspect warrants consideration is the dynamics of ownership 
change. Today, many developing countries are trying to emulate the governing 
structures and governance mechanism of the United States and other developed 
countries, but the results of such changes have not yet been fully explored (WU, et 
al., 2009). 
 There is also a dearth of research investigating questions about the types of 
owners and the changes in the proportions of concentration depending on owner’s 
types used (WU, et al., 2009, p. 177). For example, when the owner is a state, then it 
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may have other mechanisms for securing its property, so it may not rely heavily on 
the concentration of ownership, on the contrary, it may try to attract as many minority 
investors as possible to use less public funds. 
 And finally, the last aspect to which attention should be drawn is that in 
countries that were on the side of the ‘evil empire’ (“Reagan, ‘Evil Empire,’ Speech 
Text,” n.d.) during the Iron Curtain times, the concentration of power is the result of 
radical and disorderly carried out privatization (BOUBAKRI; COSSET; GUEDHAMI, 
2005).  
 To conclude, the concentration of ownership is seen as an effective internal 
mechanism of corporate governance, which often leads to the suppression of other 
external corporate governance mechanisms such as financial markets, and may also 
lead to a decrease in the efficiency of other jurisdictions such as the legal system 
(BOUBAKRI, et al., 2005; HOLMSTRÖM; TIROLE, 1993) and matters for firm 
strategy, innovation, and performance (BHAUMIK; ESTRIN; MICKIEWICZ, 2017; 
BHAUMIK, et al., 2017; BOZEC, 2005; DELL’ACQUA, et al., 2018; DEMSETZ; 
VILLALONGA, 2001).   
 The objects of our study are agro-industrial enterprises of Ukraine, which 
encompassed all of the abovementioned traits of corporate governance. Being part 
of ‘the evil empire’, Ukraine has been an independent state since 1991, which began 
to evolve on the basis of a market economy. However, the wide, ill-conceived and 
uncontrolled privatization has led to the property that was before in private ownership 
ended up in the hands of few. Even the term appeared – ‘the red director’, depicting 
the head of the company, who led it in the Soviet Union, and continued it after its 
collapse, often becoming an official millionaire or billionaire. 
 After experiencing a period of sharp and chaotic privatization, which brought 
the emergence of a large number of official owners, but a handful of real owners, 
Ukraine continued to get used to the new order. Step by step the concentration of 
property appeared which was the result of weak legal protection, and lack of order in 
the country as a whole. The gradual development and acquisitions of small 
enterprises led to the emergence of large agrarian conglomerates, many of which 
subsequently went to the stock exchanges in Warsaw and London, to seek further 
funding. 
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 Thus, Ukraine's example includes privatization, a significant concentration of 
ownership, and then the formation of a pool of powerful landowners who have 
become public companies. Some of these companies then began to liberalize 
ownership, disperse property, and some, by contrast, have a significant 
concentration to date. All this provides a good case for study the concentration of 
ownership. Moreover, to best of our knowledge, this is the first work that combines 
such a topic (concentration of ownership) and the object (Ukrainian agro-industrial 
companies).  
 The article is structured as follows. In the next section we explicate the 
research methodology. A brief overview of the twin agency problem is included in the 
second section. This is followed by a study of concentration of ownership in 
Ukrainian agro industrial companies, both listed abroad and domestically in Ukraine. 
The penultimate section devotes to elucidation and discussion of the relation 
between ownership concentration and economic performance and the paper 
concludes with a discussion.   
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 Our methodology (as methodology is a mix theories and methods) predicates 
on agency problem, institutional theory, and twin agency problem from the theory’ 
side and uses statistical methods (correlation and regression). In our analysis, we 
compared the agro industrial companies of Ukraine by dividing them into two groups: 
public ones that have significant assets in Ukraine and have, in their majority, 
Ukrainian owners, this group of enterprises we conventionally call group UX.  
 We compare this group with a group of domestic companies – named by us 
group UA. This part of paper deals with establishing presence / absent of ownership 
concentration of analysed companies. But since there are only a handful of Ukrainian 
companies on Warsaw stock exchange to form a sample for quantitative research, 
we took data for all the agro industrial companies listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange. Detailed description of our approach in quantitative research will be laid 
down in appropriate subsequent section of paper.  
3. THE TWIN AGENCY PROBLEM 
 As Stulz (2005) argues high expropriation risks warrants for corporate 
ownership to be highly concentrated, which in turn ‘limits economic growth, risk-
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sharing, financial development, and the impact of financial globalization’ (2005, p. 
1597). Thus, the impact of financial globalization is less than it could have been both 
for the host and investing parties and as a result of this the two of them incurring 
losses. 
 Stulz (2005) also believes that if that is the case, corporate insiders (owners of 
the majority shares) expropriate external investors as they maximize their own rather 
than external investor’s wealth. In doing so, they create what the author calls the 
"agent problem of corporate insider discretion". These private benefits of corporate 
insiders can take different forms, of course, from the excessive cost on corporate 
airplanes to direct or covert theft.  
 In addition, Stulz (2005) believes that public authorities influence this through 
the rights that they gave to investors in the corporation and the degree of protection 
of these rights, which in turn affects the degree of costs private investors incur in 
order to acquire economic benefits from the companies they control. Consequently, 
when the cost of allocating economic benefits to private investors is low, the 
concentrated property prevails over the dispersed one. 
 Regarding the second type of agency problem, Stulz (2005) uses the term 
"expropriation by the state" to indicate the actions of statesmen to improve their 
welfare by reducing the return on corporate investment. State rulers can use state 
power to expropriate investors through a wide range of activities, from direct 
confiscation to redistribution of tax burden. This voluntarism of state rulers when 
using state power for their own benefit creates an agent problem that R. Schulz calls 
"the agency's problem of state ruler discretion".  
 The author rightly notes that when such an agency problem exists, 
corporations with professional managers and diffused shareholders are ineffective. 
The logic behind it is straightforward and convincing. The dispersed ownership is 
ineffective because managers can better reduce the risks of state expropriation by 
taking measures when they have greater freedom of action, and when control over 
their activities is not as stiff as with diffused ownership model. In this case, managers 
become alter ego of the organizations and can easily take advantage of minority 
owners (STULZ, 2005). 
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 So adding those two agency problems we get the concept of a "twin agency 
problems", which arises because sovereign states and corporate insiders pursue 
their own interests at the expense of foreign investors. 
 In other words, there are two trends: 1) controlling investors occupy the 
company, acting without regard to minority shareholders, and 2) the government 
expropriates the wealth of shareholders, both large and small, which exacerbates the 
problem. The author calls the first problem "the agency problem of corporate insider 
discretion" the second one – "the agency problem of state ruler discretion" (STULZ, 
2005).  
 When such a double agent problem is significant, property dispersion is 
ineffective and corporate insiders are forced to hold a significant share in 
corporations. As a result, Stulz (2005) believes that concentration of property limits 
economic growth, financial development, and the country's ability to take advantage 
of financial globalization. 
3.1. Concentration of ownership in Ukrainian agro industrial companies 
 In our sample we take 10 public companies (we call this group UX) listed on 
foreign stock exchanges (as of today all Ukrainian agro industrial companies with 
shares on foreign stock exchanges) and 10 smaller domestically listed companies 
(group UA). It should also be emphasized here that all these companies from group 
UX are also registered abroad, legally they are not Ukrainian, but they have the main 
production sites and / or land in use in Ukraine.  
 Although most agro-industrial companies in Ukraine have chosen to sell their 
shares on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, we also have companies that have placed 
equity instruments (GDP) at London Stock Exchange (Standard GDRs MM), as well 
on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm (table 1).  
 Although non-public companies are not so big, but among them is also one of 
the largest land users in Ukraine - PJSC «Rise Maksymko». 
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Table 1: Agro-industrial companies of Ukraine analysed * 
 Name of the company 
Tic
ke
r 
Co
un
try
 
of 
inc
orp
ora
tio
n  
Stock 
Exchange 
Main regions of 
operation in Ukraine 
Land in 
use, ha  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Group of company UX 
1 
Avangardco 
Investment 
Public Ltd 
AVGR Cyprus LSE (Standard GDRs MM) More than 12 regions - 
2 Agroton Public Limited AGT Cyprus 
WSE (main 
market) 
Luhansk, Kharkiv, 
Donetsk 151000 
3 Astarta Holding N.V AST Netherlands WSE (main market) 
Poltava, Kharkiv, 
Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi 250000 
4 Industrial Milk Company S.A. IMC Luxembourg 
WSE (main 
market) 
Poltava, Chernihiv, 
Sumy 136600 
5 Kernel Holding S.A. KER Luxembourg WSE (main market) 
13 regions, main 
Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, 
Cherkasy, Chernivtsi 
604500 
6 KSG Agro KSG Luxembourg WSE (main market) Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv 61000 
7 MHP S.A. MHPC 
Luxembourg / 
Ukraine 
LSE (Standard 
GDRs MM) 
13 regions, main: Kyiv, 
Cherkasy, Sumy, 
Vinnytsia 
370000 
8 Ovostar union N.V. OVO Netherlands WSE (main market) Kyiv, Cherkasy - 
9 Milkiland N.V. MLK Netherlands WSE (main market) 
Sumy, Chernihiv, 
Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil - 
10 Trigon Agri TAGR Denmark 
NASDAQ 
OMX 
Stockholm 
Kharkiv, Kirovohrad 46000 
 
Group of company UA 
11 «APK-Invest» APK Ukraine - Donetsk 35000 
12 "Ahrokombinat "Slobozhanskyy" SLO Ukraine - Kharkiv 7500 
13 "Ahrokombinat "Kalyta" KAL Ukraine - Kyiv - 
14 «Ahropromyslova kompaniya» ACO Ukraine - Zaporizhzhia 11000 
15 "Ahro-Soyuz" ASZ Ukraine - Ivano-Frankivsk н.а. 
16 "Bakhmutskyy ahrarnyy soyuz" BAS Ukraine - Donetsk 13000 
17 "Etnoprodukt" ETN Ukraine - Chernihiv 4000 
18 "Kyiv-Atlantic Ukraine" KAU Ukraine - Kyiv 13000 
19 «Sad» SAD Ukraine - Sumy 4500 
20 «Rise-Maksymko» RSM Ukraine - 
All regions but 
Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi, 
Odesa. Main regions: 
Sumy, Poltava 
653000 
* Sources: sites of companies; WSE; https://smida.gov.ua/db/emitent 
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As is discernable from figure 1 and 2 the effect of a twin agency problem is felt 
in Ukrainian agro-industrial companies. Thus, among UX group companies (Figure 1 
and 2), in all companies with the exception of only Kernel, Astarta and Trigon Agri, 
the founders of the companies (one or more) retain more than 50% of the shares. 
The largest concentration of property in the Avantguard is 77.5% in the hands of 
Oleg Bakhmatyuk, who inherits this type of ownership in virtually all of his 
companies. More than 70% of the property concentration is also Agroton (75.53%) 
Milkiland (73.52%) and IMC (71.75%). In Agroton, 75.53% belongs to the founder 
Yuri Zhuravlyov, a similar situation in the IMC, where 71.75% of the shares belong to 
Cypres’ Agrovalley Limited, the end beneficiary of which is company’s founder 
Alexander Petrov. KSG Agro - 64.62% of shares held by Swiss company OLBIS 
INVESTMENTS LTD SA owned by Sergiy Kasyanov. 
 Graph 1: Share of equity instruments owned by the founders, main shareholders of 
UX group companies, % 
 Next, the Cypriot WTI Trading Limited, whose beneficiary is Yuri Kosyuk, 
holds a 66% interest in MHP. Prime One Capital Limited, which owns more than 
70% of the shares of Ovostar, is controlled by Boris Belikov (General Director) and 
Vitali Veresenko (Chairman of the Board of Directors). Through the Dutch 1 Inc. 
Cooperatief U.A. Anatoly Yurkevich owns 39.81% of the shares of the company 
‘Milkiland’, while 33.71% in Milkiland, through the same company belong to Olga 
Yurkevich. Also 5% through the Dutch R-ASSETS COOPERATIEF U.A. owns former 
top manager Vyacheslav Rekov. 
 The complicated scheme of ownership is presented in Graph 2. In general, 
the concept of "50 families" is confirmed. As could be easily discern all but one 
owner owns companies indirectly through other companies. Only the owner of 
Agroton Public Limited has control over the company as individual.  
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 Graph 2: Owners and way of owning public companies with a significant share of the 
leading owner 
A slightly different situation is with the UA group companies (figure 3). In most 
UA group companies, the majority shareholder owns 90% or more. In two cases, the 
concentration of ownership is absolute - 100%. However, a complete picture of 
ownership cannot be established due to the lack of disclosure on this issue. In 
particular, in the Bakhmut Agrarian Union- BAS, there are actually three owners who 
have worked for a long time in the other big agroholding, and there are no minority 
shareholders in this company. With regard to the Slobozhansky Agricultural Complex 
- SLO, the structure of its ownership may indicate that owning it four firms could have 
two or more owners, but because of the lack of disclosure on this issue, it is difficult 
to establish final beneficiaries. 
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 Graph 3: Share of equity instruments belonging to the largest owner of UA group 
companies, % 
A significant concentration of property held in Ukrainian companies (both UX 
and UA), even after the IPO, indicates that trust in other sources of property rights is 
low and only by concentrating most of the ownership rights in its hands the owner 
can control the company. Another option is to draw a staid foreign investor to owners 
who will serve as bulwark for any untoward interest to the company.  
This is evidenced in particular by international ratings. "Strength of Investor 
Protection Index" calculated by Doing Business  was indexed by The © Financial 
Freedom Index and Ukraine ended up 116 from out of 184 countries included in the 
rankings (“INVESTOR PROTECTION,” n.d.). The main problem is protecting the 
rights of investors, especially minority ones. 
In fact, for many companies the unchallenged dominance of large investors, 
and the usurpation of power by them, is, in fact, the main agency problem. In other 
words, not only managers’ accountability to shareholders, but also the seizure of 
companies by large shareholders is a major problem for corporate governance. If the 
law and enforcement of it does not provide sufficient protection for investors the 
founders are compelled to hold significant shares in their companies, which lead to a 
high concentration of ownership. 
The carried out research of concentration of ownership in the context of a twin 
agency problem proves the presence of the first component of a twin agency 
problem in agro-industrial companies of Ukraine - in the absence of reliable 
mechanisms for the protection of their assets, shareholders hold a predominant 
share of the equity instruments of companies in their hands. Such an agency 
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problem between majority shareholders and minority shareholders along with the 
asymmetry of information and the difference in voting rights may lead to the 
squeezing of minority shareholders. Such concentration creates a pressure on 
minority shareholders, which is assigned, for the most part, the role of statisticians or 
spectators. 
The concentration of property today serves as a substitute for the protection of 
investors' rights, the most reliable mechanism for the protection of property, since the 
institute for the protection of investors' rights remains very weak. This applies to 
companies of both group UA and UX. 
3.2. Ownership concentration and economic performance 
 Identifying the presence of a concentration of property is only the first step of 
our study. The next step is to determine how this concentration affects the 
performance of the companies. An important part in this is to determine what 
indicators are to be used as proxy of economic performance.  
 Our model takes into account the papers of predecessors and has much in 
common with the models used in (DAHYA; DIMITROV; MCCONNELL, 2008; 
DEMSETZ; VILLALONGA, 2001; LEPORE, et al., 2017). As a proxy for economic 
performance we used a market oriented measure like Tobin’s Q, and three 
accounting-based measures namely Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit/loss before tax. 
 The Demsetz and Lehn (2001) study uses accounting profit as a proxy for firm 
performance. Many studies thereafter use Tobin’s Q for measuring economic 
performance (SURESHA; RAVIKUMAR, 2018; WALTHOFF-BORM; VANACKER; 
COLLEWAERT, 2018).  
 There are several significant respects in which these two measures differ. 
First of all, accounting profit and Tobin’s Q contrast with each other in regards of 
time perspective applied. Accounting figures tends to be rather backward-looking, 
whereas Tobin’s Q is regarded as forward-looking. Effectively there is a difference 
between ‘what management has accomplished’ (accounting profit) … and ‘of what 
management will accomplish’ (Tobin’s Q) (DEMSETZ; VILLALONGA, 2001).  
 The second difference is who forms these indicators. The financial statement, 
part of which is profit, is formed by an accountant, while complying with the 
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requirements of the established standards. Tobin’s Q on the other hand is based on 
impressions, internal experiences and perceptions of investors. 
3.2.1. Dependent Variables 
 For our study, we chose both market-oriented and accounting indicators; in 
total we used 4 indicators as proxy for economic performance. We used a market 
oriented measure, the Tobin’s Q, and three accounting-based measures, i.e., Net 
cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit/loss before tax. Tobin’s Q was computed as the market 
value of assets divided by the book value of total assets, so we used the coefficient 
P/BV provided for each company by the WSE. Accounting indicators have been 
extracted from financial statements of companies.  
3.2.2. Independent variable 
 We measured the ownership concentration using percentage voting rights of 
the biggest shareholder as it was at the middle of December 2018. Those data we 
gathered resorting to open information of WSE as well as the companies' websites 
where we selectively verified information.  
3.2.3. Sample 
 For our quantitative part of research, we gathered data from Warsaw Stock 
Exchange first by selecting all the companies in the Main market of WSE, belonging 
to the category ‘Food and drinks’. Since we strived to industry-specific sample, we 
deducted companies marked as active in drinks business and ended up with 27 
companies in the sample. Due to the lack information on ownership one of those 
companies had to be cut which brought the sample down to 26. For each of 
remaining 26 firms, for those data are available as of year-end 2018, we extracted 
the identity and percentage voting rights of the biggest shareholder.  
3.2.4. Findings 
 We are going to proceed laying down the findings in three parts: regression, 
correlation and test for significance of analysis of variance. 
3.2.5. Regression 
 Based on surveyed literature, we advance the following hypothesis: 
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 Ho: There is no positive association between the ownership concentration and 
firm performance. 
H1: There is positive association between the ownership concentration and firm 
performance. 
 The first table of interest is the Model Summary table, as shown below: 
Table 2: Model Summary 
 
 
Model 
R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R 
Square 
Change 
 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .350a .122 -.073 16.80673 .122 .627 4 18 .649 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Tobin’s Q (4), Net cash flow (1), EBIDTA (2), Profit / Loss before tax (3) 
 This table 2 above provides us with the R and R2 values. The R value 
represents the simple correlation and is 0.350, which indicates a low degree of 
correlation. The R2 value of 0.122 indicates how much of the total variation in the 
dependent variable, the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN), cannot be 
explained by the independent variables, Net cash flow (1), EBIDTA (2), Profit / Loss 
before tax (3), and Tobin’s Q (4).  
 “The Standard Error of Estimate” is the standard deviation of the residuals [the 
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) - the ownership of the largest 
shareholder (CONCEN)]. The larger the R2, the smaller the SEE will be relative to 
the standard deviation of the criterion or dependent variable. This will be better fit 
and have less estimation error. The Adjusted R square value of -0.073 tells us that 
our model cannot accounts for -7.3% of variance in the ownership of the largest 
shareholder (CONCEN) – a poor model. The Significant F change, p - value of 0.649 
is greater than the α – value of 0.05 which makes the regression model not 
statistically significance.  
 Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and accept it. We conclude that, 
there is no positive association between the ownership concentration and firm 
performance. 
 In table 3, under the “Unstandardized Coefficients”, we see the Y intercept, 
reported as a constant of 61.611, and the slopes (B) of the independent variables. 
Thus, we can build the regression equation to predict the ownership of the largest 
shareholder (CONCEN) as:  
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 The ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) = 61.611 + (.000)(Net 
cash flow) + (-8.775E-5)(EBIDTA) + ( 4.602E-5)(Profit / Loss before tax) + 
(1.103)(Tobin’s Q). 
 Again, under the “Standardized Coefficients”, we find the standardized partial 
slopes (Beta). The beta for Tobin’s Q (.282) is greater in value than the beta for 
Profit / Loss before tax (.112), EBIDTA (-.351) and Net Cash Flow (-.246). This tells 
us that Tobin’s Q is the most important of the four independent variables but has not 
significant impact on the dependent variable. 
Table 3: Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 61.611 4.194  14.691 .000 
Net cash flow(1) .000 .000 -.246 -1.049 .308 
EBIDTA(2) -8.775E-5 .000 -.351 -.592 .561 
Profit/loss before tax(3) 4.602E-5 .000 .112 .189 .853 
Tobin’s Q,(4) 1.103 1.292 .282 .853 .405 
a. Dependent Variable: The ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) 
 In the last output (table 3), the significance p – values of Net cash flow, 
EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q were 0.308, 0.561, 0.853 and 0.405 
respectively. These values are greater than the α – value of 0.05 which also indicate 
that their predictor variables do not have large impact on the dependent variable. 
Thus, we can also conclude that the regression model is not statistically significance. 
In this case, the predictor variables - Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax, 
Tobin’s Q does not have much impact to predict dependent variable - the ownership 
of the largest shareholder (CONCEN). 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
The ownership of the largest shareholder 
(CONCEN) (Dependent variable) 
59.7026 16.22698 23 
Net cash flow(1) 7536.7974 23802.70169 23 
EBIDTA(2) 39931.1022 64825.62580 23 
Profit/loss before tax(3) 23264.9070 39528.24841 23 
Tobin’s Q,(4) 1.6230 4.15745 23 
 The table 4, as shown above gives the mean, standard deviation and the 
sample size of the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) as well as the 
four (4) indicators namely: Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q 
that were used as proxy for economic performance in companies. 
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3.2.6. Correlation 
 The multiple correlation coefficients, thus the Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
(R) was used to test for the significance of how the predictor variables relate to the 
dependent variable. The scatter plots diagrams with regression line, showing best – 
fitting straight line that summarizes the relationship the predictor variables and the 
dependent variable were also used.  
 The following hypotheses were outlined and tested by means of Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient (R) and the linearity tested from the scatter plots. 
Ho: There is no linear relationship between the independent variables and the 
predictor variables.   
H1: There is linear relationship between the independent variables and the predictor 
variables.   
 The Pearson’s correlation coefficient “r” values of Net cash flow, EBIDTA, 
Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q were found to be - 0.276, - 0.118, - 0.056 and 
0.068 respectively (table 5). These values indicate very low negative correlation for 
the Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax. Though the Tobin’s Q had a 
positive value but it gives a very low positive correlation. In all these cases, no linear 
relationship exists. 
 In the second output, the significance p – values of Net cash flow, EBIDTA, 
Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q. were 0.101, 0.296, 0.400 and 0.378 respectively. 
These values are greater than the α – value of 0.05 which also indicate that their 
predictor variables do not have a linear relationship with the dependent variable.  
 Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and accept it. We conclude that, 
there is no linear relationship between the dependent and predictor variables. In this 
case, the predictor variables - Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax, 
Tobin’s Q. does not have a linear relationship with the dependent variable - the 
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN). 
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Table 5: Testing the Pearson’s correlation coefficient “r” for significance 
 
The ownership of 
the largest 
shareholder 
(CONCEN) 
(Dependent 
variable) 
Net cash 
flow(1) EBIDTA(2) 
Profit/los
s before 
tax(3) 
Tobin’s Q 
(4) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
The ownership of 
the largest 
shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Depend
ent variable) 
1.000 -.276 -.118 -.056 .068 
Net cash flow(1) -.276 1.000 .301 .218 .182 
EBIDTA(2) -.118 .301 1.000 .920 .720 
Profit/loss before 
tax(3) 
-.056 .218 .920 1.000 .738 
Tobin’s Q,(4) .068 .182 .720 .738 1.000 
Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
The ownership of 
the largest 
shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Depend
ent variable) 
. .101 .296 .400 .378 
Net cash flow (1) .101 . .081 .159 .204 
EBIDTA(2) .296 .081 . .000 .000 
Profit/loss before 
tax(3) 
.400 .159 .000 . .000 
Tobin’s Q,(4) .378 .204 .000 .000 . 
N 
The ownership of 
the largest 
shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Depend
ent variable) 
23 23 23 23 23 
Net cash flow (1) 23 23 23 23 23 
EBIDTA(2) 23 23 23 23 23 
Profit/loss before 
tax(3) 
23 23 23 23 23 
Tobin’s Q,(4) 23 23 23 23 23 
 Let us see different variation of dependent variables against independent one 
by one.  
Table 6: Correlations: The ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and net 
cash flow variables 
 
The ownership of the 
largest shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Dependent 
variable) Net cash flow(1) 
The ownership of the 
largest shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Dependent 
variable) 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.028 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .890 
N 26 26 
Net cash flow(1) Pearson Correlation -.028 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .890  
N 26 26 
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 Figure 4: Scatter plot the ownership of the largest shareholder vs. net cash flow 
 From table 6, the Pearson’s correlation coefficients r, between the ownership 
of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and net cash flow variables is - 0.028, which 
indicates a very low degree of correlation. Again, the correlation between the 
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and net cash flow is not statistically 
significant (p > 0.05). Thus, the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and 
net cash flow variables are not linearly related.  
 This is shown also in the scatter plots in Figure 4, where the regression line, 
showing best – fitting straight line that summarizes that there is no linear the 
relationship the between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and 
net cash flow variables 
Table 7: Correlations: The ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and 
EBIDTA variables 
 
The ownership of the 
largest shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Dependent 
variable) EBIDTA(2) 
The ownership of the 
largest shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Dependent 
variable) 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.044 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .831 
N 26 26 
EBIDTA(2) Pearson Correlation -.044 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .831  
N 26 26 
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 Figure 5: Scatter plot the ownership of the largest shareholder vs. EBIDTA 
 From table 8, the Pearson’s correlation coefficients r, between the ownership 
of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and EBIDTA variables is - 0.044, which 
indicates a very low degree of correlation. Again, the correlation between the 
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and EBIDTA is not statistically 
significant (p > 0.05). Thus, the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and 
EBIDTA variables are not linearly related.  
 This is shown also in the scatter plots in Figure 5, where the regression line, 
showing best- fitting straight line that summarizes that there is no linear the 
relationship the between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and 
EBIDTA variables. 
Table 8: Correlations: The ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and 
Profit / Loss before tax variables 
 
The ownership of the 
largest shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Dependent 
variable) 
Profit/loss before 
tax(3) 
The ownership of the 
largest shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Dependen
t variable) 
Pearson Correlation 1 .013 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .951 
N 26 25 
Profit/loss before 
tax(3) 
Pearson Correlation .013 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .951  
N 25 25 
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 From table 8, the Pearson’s correlation coefficients r, between the ownership 
of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and Profit / Loss before tax variables is - 
0.013, which indicates a very low degree of correlation. Again, the correlation 
between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and Profit/Loss before 
tax is not statistically significant (p > 0.05). Thus, the ownership of the largest 
shareholder (CONCEN) and Profit / Loss before tax variables are not linearly related. 
 This is shown also in the scatter plots in Figure 6, where the regression line, 
showing best – fitting straight line that summarizes that there is no linear the 
relationship the between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and 
Profit / Loss before tax variables. 
 Graph 6: Scatter plot the ownership of the largest shareholder vs. Profit / Loss before 
tax 
 From table 9 we see that the Pearson’s correlation coefficients r, between the 
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and Tobin’s Q variables is 0.068, 
which indicates a very low degree of correlation. Again, the correlation between the 
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and Tobin’s Q is not statistically 
significant (p > 0.05). Thus, the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and 
Tobin’s Q variables are not linearly related. 
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Table 9: Correlations: The ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and 
Tobin’s Q variables 
 
The ownership of the 
largest shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Dependent 
variable) 
Tobin’s Q,(4) 
The ownership of the 
largest shareholder 
(CONCEN)(Dependent 
variable) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .068 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .754 
N 26 24 
Tobin’s Q,(4) Pearson 
Correlation 
.068 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .754  
N 24 24 
 This is shown also in the scatter plots in Graph 7, where the regression line, 
showing best- fitting straight line that summarizes that there is no linear the 
relationship the between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and 
Tobin’s Q variables. 
 Graph 7: Scatter plot the ownership of the largest shareholder vs. Tobin’s Q 
3.2.7. A test for significance of analysis of variance 
 We used the F ratio test for significance. We also take a look at some of the 
assumptions underlying the ANOVA test. We will use this Model: Independent 
random variables, Level of measurements, Populations are normally distributed, 
Population variances are equal.  
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 The hypotheses were:  
Ho: There exist equal means between the independent or predictor variables. 
H1: At least one of the population means between the independent or predictor 
variables is different.  
 Now we will use the ANOVA table, which reports how well the regression 
equation fits the data (i.e., predicts the dependent variable) and is shown below: 
Table 10: ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 708.538 4 177.134 .627 .649a 
Residual 5084.392 18 282.466   
Total 5792.930 22    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Tobin’s Q,(4), Net cash flow(1), EBIDTA(2), Profit/loss before 
tax(3) 
b. Dependent Variable: The ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) 
 From table 10 above, the regression model used in the ANOVA test does not 
significantly predict the dependent variable well. In this case, the regression model is 
not statistically significantly to predict the outcome variable. Thus, it is not a good fit 
for the data.  
 Using the F test, with a p - significance value of 0.649, is greater than the α – 
value of 0.05, and indicates that, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and accept it. 
Therefore, we can conclude that there exist equal means between the independent 
or predictor variables. 
 Consequently, we have not found any confirmation of the existence of a 
statistically significant relation between the concentration of ownership and the 
economic performance of enterprises. Although we did not find dependencies, the 
negative result outcomes, is also an outcome. Concentration of ownership does not 
affect the economic performance of analysed companies, regardless of whether we 
take for the analysis the accounting indicators (Profit) or market-based indicators 
(Tobin’s Q).   
 However, the strongest link exists between CONCEN and Tobin’s Q. We 
believe that is an indication of favourable investor’s reaction to such concentration, 
because they perceive the situation in the same light: the investor's weak protection 
compels the company, in order to reduce risk of expropriation of property, to 
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concentrate ownership. The market encourages concentration of ownership in 
jurisdictions with weak investor protection. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 The concentration of property is an issue that is currently acute, especially for 
countries for which the market economy was not a native environment even a few 
decades ago. Our study aimed to identify the presence / absence of ownership 
concentration in agro-industrial companies in Ukraine and to investigate the possible 
impact of these processes on the economic performance of companies. 
 We have proven that there is a significant level of ownership concentration 
among analysed companies in both groups UX and UA. Although there are 
exceptions, there is a general tendency to hold a large share of equity instruments 
by the founders or major owners. We describe this phenomenon through a twin 
agency problem, arguing that such a large share of power concentration serves as a 
substitute for a weak environment for protecting investor rights.  
 Concentration of property is the protection from unwanted interventions from 
both third parties and from state rulers. Some existing exceptions, we argue, are due 
to the involvement of powerful co-owners who provide for all sorts of shields against 
untoward interest.  
 The study has found no significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and several indicators used as proxy for economic performance, 
namely Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit/loss before tax, Tobin’s Q. In our model the R 
value is 0.350, which indicates a low degree of correlation. Our model cannot 
account for -7.3% of variance in the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) 
(The Adjusted R square value of -0.073 – table 2).  
 The Significant F change, p - value of 0.649 is greater than the α – value of 
0.05 which makes the regression model not statistically significance. Therefore, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis and accept it. We conclude that, there is no positive 
association between the ownership concentration and firm performance. The 
significance p – values of Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q 
were 0.308, 0.561, 0.853 and 0.405 respectively.  
 These values are greater than the α – value of 0.05 which also indicate that 
their predictor variables do not have large impact on the dependent variable. Thus, 
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we can also conclude that the regression model is not statistically significance. In 
this case, the predictor variables - Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax, 
Tobin’s Q. does not have much impact to predict dependent variable - the ownership 
of the largest shareholder (CONCEN). 
 The Pearson’s correlation coefficient “r” values of Net cash flow, EBIDTA, 
Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q were found to be - 0.276, - 0.118, - 0.056 and 
0.068 respectively (table 5). These values indicate very low negative correlation for 
the Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax. Though the Tobin’s Q had a 
positive value but it gives a very low positive correlation. In these cases, no linear 
relationship exists. 
 Our findings indicate that concentration of ownership does not affect the 
economic performance of analysed companies, regardless of whether we take for 
the analysis the accounting indicators (Profit) or market-based indicators (Tobin’s Q).  
However, we emphasize that the strongest link exists between CONCEN and 
Tobin’s Q.  
 Investors themselves and the market are also reacting positively to such 
concentrating, because they perceive the situation in the same light: the investor's 
weak protection compel the company, in order to reduce risk of expropriation of 
property, to concentrate ownership. The market encourages concentration of 
ownership in jurisdictions with weak investor protection. 
 An agency issue of corporate insider's action at their discretion should be 
absorbed by properly organized corporate governance. In this regard, the further 
direction of research in this area would be the development of practical measures to 
strengthen corporate governance at the company level and the regulation of the 
protection of minority shareholder rights at the state’s level. 
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